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Comparing the organization of  
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and eastern European countries 
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Karel Sima and Kadri Ukrainski 
In this article, we present a comparative analysis of the organization of public funding of research in 
three central and eastern European countries. We first compare the organization of funding agencies, 
the portfolio of funding instruments and, finally, the repartition of funding by beneficiaries. Further, we 
identify the main structural characteristics of the funding systems, by looking at features like sectoral 
divisions, level of delegation and the role of different institutional levels in the management of funding. 
Against a widespread conception of research policies in central and eastern European countries 
converging towards a western-style model, our study displays profound differences between the 
considered countries, related to history but also to contextual factors in the reform phase. 
URING AND AFTER the breakdown of the 
Communist regimes, research policies and 
research funding systems in central and east-
ern European countries (CEECs) underwent a pro-
cess of restructuring (Radosevic and Auriol, 1998; 
Meske, 2004). This included the breakdown of the 
old system of governance, accompanied by a strong 
reduction of the investments in the sector especially 
at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, under the 
Communist regimes, CEECs had a higher level of 
R&D expenditures than expected from their level of 
economic development. This is no longer true and 
some countries, such as Poland, even 15 to 20 years 
after the transition, are below this level (Radosevic, 
2005). Further major changes have taken place in the 
organization of research systems, with dramatic de-
creases of industrial research expenditures and, in 
the public sector, the emergence of higher education 
institutions (HEIs) as a relevant research actor, as 
well as a decreasing role or even the transformation 
of the academies of sciences structures. Finally, we 
witnessed the set-up of new governance arrange-
ments and the creation of new funding mechanisms 
and agencies, including instruments for funding re-
search in higher education and the introduction of 
project funding instruments. 
However, available evidence shows that, first, this 
process is far from being complete and many re-
forms are planned in the next years and, second, that 
there are large differences between individual  
countries in the pace of the transformation; some of 
them are engaged in the last phase of transformation 
(as are Czech Republic and Poland), some lag be-
hind (as do Bulgaria and Romania) (Meske, 2004). 
Thus, the model where CEECs move from the 
Communist system towards a ‘western’ style organi-
zation of research policy might have represented 
rather well the first phases of transition, where the 
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most evident specificities of Communist research 
policies have been removed, but a more differenti-
ated approach, taking into account also national 
specificities, is now required. 
This article, which is based on a project realized 
in the PRIME Network of Excellence on research 
and innovation policies, provides an in-depth analy-
sis of public research funding systems in three cen-
tral and eastern European countries — namely, 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland — matching 
qualitative description of funding instruments with 
quantitative data on the share of instruments and of 
their beneficiaries. The main goal is to compare the 
structures of public funding systems and the inter-
play between funding channels. This includes the 
degree of segmentation in domains (e.g. between 
academies of sciences and HEIs), the level of com-
petition and complementarity between instruments 
and the role of institutional levels (the state vs. fund-
ing agencies vs. research organizations vs. research 
units). Further, by matching this structural analysis 
with data on funding volumes, we aim to understand 
the evolution of the system, looking also to gradual 
shifts in addition to radical restructuring. 
The topic is of interest for comparative research 
policy studies, where the issue of convergence and 
differences between national systems has been 
highly debated (Lepori et al, 2007a; Senker et al, 
1999). CEECs represent an ideal laboratory to study 
the evolution of research funding, since changes are 
more rapid and profound than in western European 
countries and there is evidence of large differences 
between individual countries. Moreover, the topic is 
also relevant for European and national research pol-
icy; data on innovation, economic performance and 
labour productivity are a source of concern, since 
according to some studies many CEECs are not per-
forming as well in this respect as would be expected 
from their current level of R&D investment 
(Stephan, 2002). Besides other factors, this might 
also be related to weaknesses in the transfer of re-
search activities towards economic innovation (Ra-
dosevic, 2005). While the organization of public 
research funding is only one of the elements to be 
considered, a detailed understanding of its organiza-
tion might well provide some useful insights to ex-
plain this productivity gap. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In 
the second section, we introduce a framework for the 
analysis of public research funding. The third sec-
tion provides an analysis of the main components of 
the funding system in Czech Republic, Estonia and 
Poland, while the fourth section takes stock of this 
information to analyse the organizational structures 
of public funding systems in these countries. The 
last section proposes some general conclusions and 
reflections. 
Conceptualizing the organization  
of public funding systems 
Public funding systems for research have been ex-
amined in the literature from different perspectives. 
Some studies looked to the prevailing policy goals 
and intervention rationales and how they are trans-
lated in specific funding instruments (as well as their 
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evolution across time; Potì and Reale, 2007); a re-
lated perspective deals with more basic features like 
the design of science policy (Guston, 2000) and the 
delegation modes underlying funding mechanisms 
(Braun, 2003). Detailed analyses have also been de-
voted to funding agencies (Braun, 1998; Van der 
Meulen, 2003), as well as to the strategic choices 
and behaviour of large performers (Sanz-Menéndez 
and Cruz-Castro, 2003) and of individual researchers 
(Laudel, 2006). 
In comparative studies, these approaches have led 
to results concerning similarities and differences be-
tween countries. While, looking mostly to western 
European countries, convergence has been demon-
strated concerning policy rationales (Lemola, 2002) 
and, to a large extent, also evaluation mechanisms 
(Larédo, 2008), stronger national specificities have 
been identified in the organization of funding agen-
cies and instruments, which seems to be driven by 
their embeddedness into national systems (Senker et 
al, 1999; Braun et al, 2003). 
This article focuses on the comparison of organiza-
tional structures of public funding of research and, 
specifically, on the identification of its macro-level 
structures. We basically represent public funding sys-
tems as a set of exchange relationships between dif-
ferent types of funding agencies — including 
ministries, research councils, other agencies — and a 
(usually larger) set of research performers, where the 
former finance performers provide research services. 
These relationships are highly institutionalized in 
form of hierarchical structures — for example, group-
ing research units in larger organizations such as uni-
versities — as well as funding instruments and 
allocation criteria; nevertheless, they leave (variable) 
room for individual behaviour through negotiation 
between funders and performers, competitive alloca-
tion with specific selection procedures and strategies 
of performers in fund-raising. 
Beyond the micro-level dynamics, we are looking 
for stable configurations which characterize a large 
portion of the whole funding system. This includes 
the organization of funding agencies and instru-
ments, looking for example for distinctions between 
categories of agencies, as well as types of instru-
ments (core vs. project funding; Lepori et al, 2007a); 
it includes also specifying the role of different or-
ganizational levels for managing funding streams, 
between for example university directions and re-
search units. 
However, the most relevant issue is to identify 
stable arrangements in the relationships between 
funding agencies and performers. By this, we mean 
a set composed by (one or more) funding agencies,  
a set of allocation instruments and of performers,  
accounting for a significant share of public funding 
of research. Some of these sets might be formalized 
in public law and formal organizational structures, 
as in the case of a public research organization fund-
ing its own laboratories on its core budget, while 
others might be institutionalized through softer 
mechanisms such as past experience, joint expecta-
tions, specific competences and reputation of per-
formers defining a stable relationship between the 
funder and performers side (White, 2002, on institu-
tionalized markets). 
There are some good reasons why this approach 
might yield interesting results. First, system-level 
studies of whole funding systems are relatively rare 
in the literature. Most studies in the field focus on 
individual funding schemes and agencies, with a  
focus on research councils (Van der Meulen, 2003; 
Slipersaeter et al, 2007), or on specific funding in-
struments, like recent work on public project fund-
ing (Lepori et al, 2007a). Looking to the main 
structural features might provide hints on some cate-
gorization of national systems towards the identifi-
cation of some basic models and a categorization of 
funding systems (see Whitley, 2003). 
Second, it has been argued that organizational 
forms of public funding have a relevant impact on 
the functioning of the research system and on the 
type of research which is supported, beyond the 
original policy goals and the selection mechanisms 
adopted (Larédo, 2008; Whitley, 2003). The idea 
that institutions and organizational structures matter 
for the development of science is not new, but it has 
rarely been applied to the analysis of funding sys-
tems. It might thus be that differences in perform-
ance between research systems, for example 
between the USA and Europe or between CEECs 
and western Europe, are not so much related to dif-
ferent policies, but to their underlying institutional 
and organizational structures (Bonaccorsi, 2007). 
Third, available empirical evidence shows that it 
is exactly at the level of institutional settings and or-
ganizational structures that differences between 
countries remain more important, and that there is 
evidence of influence of national contexts, as well as 
of path-dependency (Senker et al, 1999; Lepori et al, 
2007a). Thus, the analysis of organizational struc-
tures is a relevant entry point to understand the im-
pact of national cultures and histories on research 
policies and systems. Moreover, if organizations 
matter for systems performance, it becomes critical 
to better understand their embeddedness in national 
contexts in order to design reform policies which are 
compatible with each of them, but at the same time 
lead to international competitiveness in science (see 
Amable, 2000, on social systems of innovation and 
production). 
Organizational models of public funding:  
three main cases 
We introduce in this section three organizational 
models for public funding which, in most countries, 
constitute the main building blocks of the whole sys-
tem (Lepori et al, 2007). 
Core funding to public research organizations In 
this mode, the state allocates a global budget to  
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research organizations, such as universities or large 
public research organizations, for their normal func-
tioning. Funding is attributed to ensure the existence 
of the organization and, in principle, is not limited in 
time; also, it is usually left to the steering body of 
the organization to decide how to allocate funds in-
ternally to individual units (earmarking might be 
present, but is typically limited to a low share of 
funding). 
This mode creates a nested structure (Braun, 
2003), with the possibility of competition both at the 
institutional level and at the level of internal units 
(Figure 1). 
The organization of funding agencies, the number 
of players and the organization of performers can 
vary widely. Usually, funding of HEIs is assumed by 
a single ministry at national level and thus, at least in 
principle, there is potential competition between in-
dividual institutions; however, their number varies 
from country to country and this is likely to influ-
ence actor’s behaviour (e.g. the likelihood of collu-
sion between performers). In public research 
organizations (PROs), different settings are also  
possible, for example with all PROs being funded 
through the same agency — such as a research min-
istry — or with sectoral ministries funding directly 
their own units. In the first case, there might be di-
rect competition for resources, in the second, compe-
tition will be between policy domains. 
Moreover, there are different options concerning 
the allocation criteria to individual institutions, 
choosing between historical allocation, contractual 
arrangements, indicators-based allocation (see 
Jongbloed, 2008, for HEIs), with different degrees 
of competition between institutions. Also, organiza-
tional settings strongly differ concerning mission 
and tasks — especially between universities, where 
research is closely related to education and public 
laboratories — as well as concerning internal organ-
izational rules and the degree of competition be-
tween internal units (Larédo, 2008). 
Project funding In this mode, funding is allocated 
directly to a research group or an individual by a 
funding agency (Figure 2). The state controls the re-
partition of funds between agencies and instruments 
— the definition of the portfolio — and to some ex-
tent the allocation criteria, while it has little control 
on the selection of beneficiaries (Lepori et al, 
2007a). 
While there are a large number of studies based 
on the principal-agent framework on individual 
funding agencies (Braun, 1998; Van der Meulen, 
2003), recent work has compared the structure of 
project funding in western European countries, 
showing that in almost all countries it is highly dif-
ferentiated with many agencies and instruments cov-
ering most of the themes and types of research and 
with limited coordination (Lepori et al, 2007a); this 
creates room for strategic choice of the research 
units on how to get funded, thus reducing steering 
capacity of the state. However, there is some evi-
dence that the market is segmented according to sub-
ject domains, type of research and performers; 
quantitative data show wide differences in the share 
of funding instruments attributed to different per-
formers’ categories (Lepori et al, 2007a), as well as 
in success rates between groups of applicants (Viner 
et al, 2006). 
Vertical integration In this mode, a umbrella or-
ganization with a generic research mandate is dele-
gated by the state and attributed a global budget 
which is then allocated to its internal units either as 
Research Organization 
State 
Research Organization 
Research Organization 
Unit Unit Unit Unit 
Figure 1. Funding arrangements: institutional funding
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Funding agency 
Funding agency 
Research unit 
Research unit 
Figure 2. Funding arrangements: project funding
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institutional funding or using competitive means 
(Figure 3). Examples are the French National Centre  
for Scientific Research (CNRS) (Thèves et al, 2007), 
CSIC in Spain, Max-Planck Gesellschaft in Ger-
many and the academies of sciences organizations in 
many CEECs before the transition. 
While for some aspects this mode resembles core 
funding of HEIs, it shows also distinct features: thus, 
competition is not between umbrella organizations, 
being in many cases unique, but with other sectors 
and mechanisms, such as funding of higher educa-
tion or project funding. Moreover, the umbrella  
organization has a larger role than funding laborato-
ries, such as defining strategies, creating and dis-
solving units and setting rules for employment and 
internal careers; allocation of funding thus usually 
comes with the definition of internal evaluation 
mechanisms, with different settings in each case 
(Larédo, 2008). In fact, this mode tends to create a 
largely closed system with limited interaction with 
the rest of the research system, even if in some cases 
this has changed in the recent years (see Thèves et 
al, 2007 for the case of the French CNRS). The de-
gree of closeness/openness of these vertically inte-
grated systems is a relevant empirical question. 
From individual models to a system approach 
In most countries, funding systems are composed of 
a combination of these models, with different pro-
portions. One can distinguish between the US sys-
tem based on project funding and the continental 
European one, built on a combination of core and 
project funding (Lepori et al, 2007a). While in some 
cases different modes coexist, such as core funding 
of HEIs alongside a vertically integrated organiza-
tion such as Max-Planck Gesellschaft in Germany, 
in other cases they complement each other, with re-
search units having a dual funding system based on 
core funding from their parent organization plus pro-
ject funding from different agencies. 
Our hypothesis is thus that, beyond the descrip-
tion of individual schemes, it is their combination 
that determines the characteristics of a national sys-
tem, such as the capacity of the state to steer re-
search through funding, the degree of autonomy of 
laboratories and the power of different organiza-
tional levels — for example, university directions vs. 
head of laboratories; this configuration largely de-
termines the incentive system for performers and the 
conditions of their competition, inside but also 
across institutional sectors. 
While it is by no means an aim of this article to 
build a complete typology of funding systems and to 
explore in general the relationship between its con-
figuration and these general characteristics, we per-
form an exploratory analysis in the case of the three 
CEECs considered and inquire whether it provides 
some additional evidence on the system’s function-
ality. 
We perform the analysis in two steps. First, we 
analyse separately the three components of a funding 
system, namely the structure of funding bodies and 
the share of public funding managed by them, the 
types of funding instruments and their allocation cri-
teria and, finally, the categories of research per-
formers and their share in public research funding, 
as well as the share of instruments in their total re-
sources. 
In the second step, we use this information to re-
construct for the most recent years (2005 or 2006) 
the structural scheme of public funding, as well as 
for an overall characterization and comparison be-
tween the three involved countries. 
The chosen perimeter includes public research 
funding, attributed by national states and inter-
national agencies and programmes such as the Euro-
pean Union. To certain extent also funding from 
private charities has been included, as it is by its 
goals rather similar to public research funding. We 
include to some extent public funding to private 
companies, but no complete analysis of private re-
search funding is provided. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we include only research funding to HEI, 
excluding funding for educational activities (with 
the exception of funding to PhD students, considered 
as research funding). This is a very rough approxi-
mation since research and education in universities 
are difficult to separate; however, the situation in 
CEECs is partially different since at their origin 
HEIs were not supposed to do research. 
Information and data have been collected for each 
of the three countries by the project participants, us-
ing official reports and state budgets or directly from 
the funding agencies. Time coverage is in most cases 
from the mid-1990s to 2005–2006. 
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Figure 3. Funding arrangements: vertical integration
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Comparing the main components  
of funding systems 
In this section, we compare for the three countries 
the role of funding agencies, the types of funding in-
struments and the categories of beneficiaries, and we 
measure their share in public research funding. We 
include also some preliminary information on evolu-
tion across time. 
It is relevant to consider that we are confronted 
here with three different countries (see Table 1). 
Poland is the largest country in central and eastern 
Europe, the Czech Republic is a medium-size  
country with one of the highest levels of economic 
development, while Estonia is a very small, but until 
the 2008/9 global financial crisis a rather rapidly de-
veloping country. With a GDP per capita of about 
80% of the European (EU-27) average, Estonia and 
the Czech Republic have the highest levels among 
CEECs, exceeding also the level of Portugal, while 
Poland reaches only half of the European level and 
has the lowest level, just above Bulgaria. 
The level of public investment in R&D and its 
evolution differ also remarkably. In Estonia and in 
the Czech Republic, public R&D expenditures have 
strongly grown in the last 10 years — both in abso-
lute values and as a percentage of GDP — and are 
approaching the EU average (0.63% of GDP in 
2006), while Poland witnessed a stagnation in real 
terms, respectively a decrease in percentage of GDP 
and has now one of the lowest levels in the whole 
EU. In purchasing power parities at prices of 2000, 
public funding for research (gross expenditure on 
R&D funded by the government) increased from 
1998 to 2006 by 150% in Estonia, by 91% in the 
Czech republic, but only by 9% in Poland (Eurostat 
database). 
Even if in this article we will not try to link directly 
the structure of public funding systems with outputs, 
it is interesting to provide some information on this 
aspect. Results are roughly similar to the analysis of 
inputs, with the Czech Republic and Estonia sitting 
just below the EU average and, for some indicators, 
outperforming some western European countries, and 
Poland having some of the lowest scores among EU 
countries together with Bulgaria and Romania. 
The Czech Republic and Estonia have about 500 
Web of Science publications per million inhabitants 
per year, which is about two thirds of the EU average 
and near to level of Spain and Italy, while with fewer 
than 400 publications per million inhabitants Poland 
is in the lowest group with levels nearer to the Bal-
kan countries (EC, 2008). Despite its methodologi-
cal limitations in general (Schibany and Streicher, 
2008) and in the measurement of innovation in 
CEECs, the same picture is provided by the Euro-
pean Innovation Scoreboard, with both Estonia and 
the Czech Republic belonging to the group of moder-
ate innovators just below the EU average (rank 16 and 
18) and before most southern European countries, 
while Poland is in the lowest ranked group (rank 27 
in 2008). Both the Czech Republic and Estonia also 
score significantly better than Poland in the five-year 
improvement of innovation performance. 
Funding agencies 
In an analysis of the role of agencies in public fund-
ing, it is interesting to look at two issues: the level of 
delegation from the national state to autonomous or-
ganizations on the one hand; the level of centraliza-
tion or differentiation of public funding bodies on the 
other. We distinguish between following categories: 
• Research and/or education ministry, usually the 
main body in charge of research policy; a strong 
role in funding of the ministry should be probably 
understood as the lowest level of delegation. 
• Other state ministries, still part of the state or-
ganization, but with looser linkage to research 
policy. 
• Intermediary agencies, including the research 
councils, but also other agencies with large auton-
omy from the state (at least in operational terms). 
• International funding agencies, international or-
ganizations and the EU framework programs (EU 
structural funds are included in national funding, 
since they are usually distributed by a national 
agency). 
• We consider separately the academies of sciences 
because of their specific organizational setting 
and role in the research system. 
Table 1. Basic data on the involved countries and their research system, 2006
 Czech Republic Estonia Poland 
Population in millions 10.25 1.34 38.10 
GDP (million PPS) 189,970 21,636 47,0418 
GDP per capita (PPS) 18,500 16,100 12,300 
GERD (million PPS) 2,933 246 2,614 
GERD % GDP 1.54% 1.14% 0.56% 
GERD financed by GOV (million PPS) 1,143 110 1503 
GERD financed by GOV as % GDP 0.60% 0.51% 0.32% 
Source: Eurostat database 
Central and eastern European countries 
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The picture for the three considered countries is 
shown in Figure 4. 
We are thus facing three different models. In Po-
land, since 1991 almost the whole budget is concen-
trated at the research and higher education ministry, 
thus also funding to academies of sciences institutes 
is managed directly by the ministry (Jabłecka and 
Lepori, this issue). Estonia has a mixed structure 
with a strong education ministry, as well as two 
largely independent agencies (the Estonian Science 
Foundation [ESF] and Enterprise Estonia), corre-
sponding to the two ministries in charge of research 
funding (Ministry of Research and Ministry of Econ-
omy; Masso and Ukrainski, this issue). Finally, the 
Czech Republic has a differentiated structure with 
the Academy of Sciences keeping a significant and 
strong role of resort ministries for funding research 
in their domains. 
While in Poland centralization has been very sta-
ble in the last 15 years, more significant changes 
have taken place in the two other countries. In Esto-
nia, the ESF had a dominant role in the first half of 
the 1990s, but lost importance with the strengthen-
ing of the programs directly managed by the educa-
tion ministry; moreover, a number of research 
funding programs are nowadays managed by the 
economics ministry through Enterprise Estonia. We 
had thus an evolution from a model centralized in 
the research council towards a more differentiated 
system. The Czech Republic witnessed a gradual 
evolution with the educational ministry increasing 
its role and the other ministries and the Academy of 
Sciences losing ground, but without a fundamental 
shift of roles. 
Allocation modes 
Concerning allocation modes, we elaborate on the 
distinction between project funding and institutional 
funding (see Lepori et al, 2007b) by introducing two 
further categories: institutional project funding, 
meaning funding provided to whole research institu-
tions (e.g. universities) for their normal operation, 
but allocated on the basis of competitive proposals, 
and centres and networks of excellence, meaning 
funds provided to support the establishment of new 
research centres of networks, on a larger scale and 
longer duration than ‘usual’ project funding (thus 
coming nearer to institutional funding). This classi-
fications looks to structural features of the alloca-
tion, rather than to issues such as the type of 
research funded or the specific research themes.  
Table 2 presents the definitions and the instruments 
in the considered countries, and Figure 5 shows 
shares of different allocation modes per country. 
In Estonia, project funding covers about three 
quarters of total funding, while there are very few 
instruments for institutional funding: three instru-
ments directed to universities and managed by the 
research ministry, as well as some limited infrastruc-
ture funding from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the Ministry of Culture. Project funding is more dif-
ferentiated among agencies including the research 
ministry, Estonian Science Foundation, Enterprise 
Estonia and the European Union. Historically, the 
system switched around 1997–1998 from institu-
tional to project funding with the end of the base-
line funding from the Estonian Science Foundation; 
since 2005 some new instruments for institutional 
funding of universities have been introduced, but at 
the same time project funding from European 
sources has also increased. 
Poland displays a share of two thirds for institu-
tional funding and one third for project funding, 
which is typical of many western European countries 
(Lepori et al, 2007a); change from the mid-1990s 
has been limited, except some increase in the share 
of project funding due to the European framework 
programs. Almost all national funding is managed 
Figure 4. Role of different funding agencies, 2006 (percentages of total public funding) 
Notes:  Intermediaries: Czech Science Foundation, Polish Foundation for Science, Estonian Science 
Foundation, Enterprise Estonia and Environmental Investments Centre International agencies: 
mostly funding from EU Framework Programs, for Poland includes also EU structural funds 
Estonia: data for 2005 
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by the research ministry, while European framework 
programs have a significant role. 
Finally, the Czech Republic displays the most 
complex situation. While funding to governmental 
institutes and Academy of Sciences institutes is allo-
cated through so-called research plans which can be 
considered as institutional funding, research plans of 
HEIs — despite having the same name — have quite 
different allocation mechanisms: namely, they are 
attributed through competitive submission of pro-
posals and, in the most recent round, some HEIs got 
their plans refused. This mechanism represents an 
intermediate between institutional and project fund-
ing. Project funding is rather differentiated among 
ministries managing department programmes on 
their specific area of competence (as well as a  
national research programme coordinated by the 
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports MEYS). It 
Table 1. Allocation modes and instruments per country, 2006
Name Definition Czech Republic Estonia Poland 
Institutional 
funding 
Funding attributed to whole 
research organizations for their 
institutional mission and their  
long-term existence 
• Research plans of 
Academy of Sciences 
institutes 
• Research plans of 
governmental institutes 
• Specific research funding 
of HEIs 
• MER base financing and 
infrastructure costs 
• PhD grants programme 
• Statutory funding and in-
house research funding 
of HEIs 
• Investments 
Competitive 
institutional  
funding 
Institutional funding, attributed 
through competitive submission  
of proposals and with some 
possibility of non-renewal of the 
grant 
Research plans of HEIs None None 
Project funding 
(national) 
Funding attributed for research 
activities of limited scope and 
duration to individual research 
units or researchers 
• National Research 
Programme and 
departmental 
programmes 
• Czech Science 
Foundation grants 
• Ministry of Industry and 
Trade programs (in fact 
departmental 
programmes) 
• MER targeted financing 
• ESF grants 
• Enterprise Estonia 
programmes 
• Others 
• Research projects 
(bottom-up) 
• Goal-oriented projects 
Project funding 
(international) 
Project funding attributed by 
international agencies and 
organizations, including  
European Union 
EU Framework 
Programmes 
EU Framework 
Programmes 
EU Framework 
Programmes 
Networks and 
centres of 
excellence 
Funds devoted to establish  
new competences centres and 
cooperation networks, however 
limited in time and based on 
proposal submission 
• Research centres 
(cooperation networks) 
• Centres for basic 
research 
• Centres of excellence 
(COE) programme 
• COE 
• Technology platforms 
• Centres of competence 
• Research networks – as 
new organizational forms 
but funded through 
traditional instruments 
Figure 5. Shares of different allocation modes per country, 2006 
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accounted in 2006 for nearly half of the total public 
funding, and competitive institutional funding (HEI 
research plans) for a further 16%, while traditional 
institutional funding (Academy of Sciences and pub-
lic research organizations) for about 30%. Since the 
year 2000, there has been a continuous increase in 
the share of project funding, with a parallel decrease 
in the share of research plans of research institutes. 
Structure of performers 
If we look to the performers, we can distinguish be-
tween four main sectors: higher education, the re-
search institutes of the academies of sciences, the 
remaining institutes in the public sector and, finally, 
private companies. We are interested in their shares 
in public funding and its changes across time, but 
also through which agencies and instruments the dif-
ferent groups are funded (Figure 6). 
The Estonian system is dominated by a small 
number of universities, with the University of Tartu, 
the University of Tallinn and the Estonian Univer-
sity of Life Sciences receiving 54% of public fund-
ing (including the private sector), while the rest of 
the system is composed of a large number of small-
size research institutes. 
Poland displays a larger system with three sectors: 
higher education, research institutes, and Academy of 
Sciences. However, the significance of these divi-
sions is lessened by the fact that allocation of institu-
tional funding is centralized to the ministry using the 
same rules for the three sectors and that most institu-
tional funding is provided to research units directly 
(departments in HEIs). Time series display a rein-
forcement of the HEI sector at the expense of the two 
other sectors in the 1990s, but stability since then. 
The Czech Republic is the only country showing 
an Academy of Sciences sector with its own funding 
channels, including an internal project funding 
agency, alongside a large higher education sector. 
The share of these two sectors has been rather stable 
since the year 2001, while other public research in-
stitutes continuously decreased since then. The high 
share of the private sector is largely explained by re-
search institutes that were reorganized (‘privatized’) 
from state research organization in first half of the 
1990s (both departmental and as part of state indus-
trial companies).These research labs (now mainly 
registered as limited liability companies or corpora-
tions) are still partly oriented towards public re-
search funding and are relatively successful in 
competition for projects of applied research and in 
cooperative projects with research centres. This is 
very different from Poland, where branch R&D units 
kept their status, even if many of them had to sell 
non-research services (such as renting spaces) to 
survive and thus weakened their traditional role of 
linking the public research sector and business 
(Gorzynski et al, 2009). 
A summary comparison 
Table 3 provides an overview of the main features of 
public funding in the three considered countries. 
Structural features of  
CEEC funding systems 
In this section, we use the information from the pre-
vious section to understand the overall organization 
of the funding system in three countries considered. 
Figure 6. Share of different performers in public research funding, 2005 
Central and eastern European countries 
 
 Science and Public Policy November 2009 676 
Poland: a system centred on the research ministry 
Poland displays a system where a single player — 
the Ministry of Science and Higher Education 
(MSHE) — manages almost all public funding, and 
a single funding instrument — primary statutory 
funding — is the dominant funding source for all 
performers in the public sector (see Figure 7). 
Moreover, most of the institutional funding is di-
rectly allocated to institutional units, departments in 
HEIs and research institutes in the Academy of Sci-
ences and in the government sector. Project funding 
plays a significant role as a funding source, but at 
least in the aggregate, its share is probably too low 
to be a major force for the structural evolution of the 
research system. 
As a whole, the funding system is characterized 
by low levels of delegation and by no sectoral divi-
sions, since the basic funding mechanism is the same 
for all units. At least concerning funding, intermedi-
ary structures between the ministry and the institutes 
level have lost their role, including funding agencies, 
umbrella organizations such as the Academy of Sci-
ences, but also the directions of the universities. 
With the reform of 1991, decision-making power 
was originally attributed to a committee composed of 
scientists themselves with little intervention from the 
public administration; this changed after 2000 with 
the creation of the Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education, while first steps towards more delegation 
of funding competences to autonomous agencies were 
take after 2004 (Jabłecka and Lepori, this issue). 
Thus, Poland basically adopted the vertically inte-
grated model at the level of the whole country. 
In evolutionary terms, structural change from the 
soviet period has been rather limited, with the minis-
try replacing the Academy of Science in the central 
role of allocating body, and co-opting the same  
scientific elites in the decision-making process. The 
reform of 1991, with the centralization of funding in 
the ministry, had the effect of largely transferring the 
old system of allocation to the new political regime, 
making further reforms difficult. 
Estonia: limited competition between few players 
The Estonian system displays a structure character-
ized by the variety of funding agencies and sources, 
but a limited number of relevant performers (Figure 
8). Differentiation in the funding agencies took place 
from the 1990s — when the Estonian Science Foun-
dation had a dominant role — with the strengthening 
of the role of the Ministry of Education and Re-
search, the creation of Enterprise Estonia and the 
emergence of European Union framework programs 
as a major funding source. 
At the same time, at the performer’s level, the 
system underwent a concentration process with the 
integration of the research institutes of the Academy 
of Sciences in the universities; this process is proba-
bly also related to the small size of the research sys-
tem (public research funding amounted to €65 
million in 2005, including EU funds). Nowadays, 
the three largest players in the public research sys-
tem — University of Tartu, Tallin University of 
Technology and the Estonian University of Life Sci-
ence — account for over 70% of the total funding 
from the most important national instruments, and 
100% of funding from the centres of excellence pro-
gramme. This pattern is consistent across instru-
ments — with similar shares of the main players for 
most instruments — and increases also with time 
(Masso and Ukrainski, this issue). 
We find here the opposite situation to that in Po-
land: there is strong delegation and limited coordina-
tion at the level of the funding agencies, but three 
Table 2. Summary table: components of the funding system
Country Funding agencies Allocation modes Structure of performers 
Czech Republic The system is highly differentiated,  
with an important role for the Ministry 
of Education, Youth and Sport, and for 
the sectoral ministries; Academy of 
Sciences manages a significant 
proportion of funding, while 
autonomous funding agencies (Czech 
Science Foundation) are less relevant 
About half of the funding volume is 
composed of project funding, half by 
institutional funding. Institutional 
funding of HEIs is attributed through a 
competitive procedure rather similar to 
project funding, but at the institutional 
level. A significant proportion of public 
project funding benefits to private 
companies 
A large HEI sector alongside a large 
academy of sciences sector; the shares 
have been rather stable since 2001. 
Large private research activities 
Estonia The most important funding agency  
is the Ministry of Education and 
Research, alongside the Ministry of 
Economy through Estonian Enterprise. 
In the 1990s the Estonian Science 
Foundation had a dominant role, which 
has strongly decreased afterwards 
Mostly project funding instruments  
with a rather large number of funding 
agencies, only a few institutional 
funding instruments 
HEIs play the dominant role and 
research capacity is concentrated in 
just three universities; a large number 
of smaller research units 
Poland Since 1991, funding is completely 
centralized in the Ministry of Science 
and Higher Education which manages 
both institutional and project funding 
2/3 institutional funding and 1/3 project 
funding; institutional funding is 
allocated to institutional units 
(departments in HEIs). Substantial 
stability since 2001 
The HEI sector is the largest, but 
substantial share of research institutes 
and academy of sciences institutes; 
strong increase of the role of HEIs in 
the 1990s, but stability since then 
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performers dominate the research system and consis-
tently get similar shares from each agency. In this 
case, one can assume that the performers largely 
drive the allocation decisions of funding agencies. In 
so small a system, the prevalence of project funding 
and the lack of central steering lead to strong con-
centration because of cumulative effects, reducing 
the diversity of performers and, in the end, also the 
level of competition. Consequently, one might fear 
adverse effects on the innovation capacity of the sys-
tem in the long run. 
Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic displays the most complex sys-
tem, where sector divisions between Academy of 
Science, departmental research centres and HEIs are 
strong also concerning funding (Figure 9). 
Thus, the Academy of Sciences sector is charac-
terized by its specific institutional funding mecha-
nism, but at the same time is able to get a significant 
share of project funding, while other public research 
institutes are financed through their responsible min-
istry, and get low resources from project funding. 
Finally, HEIs receive 85% of their resources through 
competitive allocation mechanisms, both quasi-
institutional and project. 
There are two further characteristics of the Czech 
system that have to be mentioned. First, the role of in-
dependent intermediary bodies (CSF) in project fund-
ing is negligible and most project funding is managed 
directly from ministries (Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Industry being the most important). The 
relevant exception is the Academy of Sciences, which 
has an highly autonomous position (organizational 
and financial), but internal allocation is largely insti-
tutional, while funding from the internal science 
foundation represent a small share of the total volume. 
The second characteristic is the significant role of 
(legally) private research labs in the Czech public 
research funding system. This sector consists partly 
of former state research institutes and research de-
partments of state-owned industrial companies that 
were restructured in first half of the 1990s and retain 
a significant role in applied research funded by both 
public and private sources. 
Thus, the organization of funding is characterized 
by a strong fragmentation of the whole system, with 
each performing sector having preferred linkages 
with its own main funder and high diversity of allo-
cation criteria. While this could be seen as a way of 
keeping diversity of performers and functions in a 
rather small-scale system, this could limit the level 
of competition to actors inside the same sector (and 
even more concerning departmental institutes). The 
rather high share of project funding is likely to pro-
mote some intersectoral competition, but one could 
raise some questions if the lack of independent 
agencies and the fragmentation into a large number 
of departmental programmes led to competition or to 
the creation of small-scale circles of (repeating) cus-
tomers for each specific programme. 
 Project funding 29.4% 
0.2% 
MSHE 
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HEI 
7% 5.2% 0.9% 3.4% 0.4% 13.2% 1.1% 2.5% 
1.5% 1.6% 
Figure 7. Poland: structure of the public funding system, 2006 
Note:  For MSHE fund and Foundation for Polish Science there are no data on beneficiaries 
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Conclusions 
From the previous analysis, it is apparent that the 
three countries considered display different organiza-
tional forms of research funding. This emerges not 
only by comparing the aggregate indicators, such as 
the level of public funding, the share of project fund-
ing and the role of different performers, but especially 
by looking at how the relationships between state, 
funding agencies and performers are organized. 
Thus, the Polish system displays a very high level 
of centralization, with the ministry managing di-
rectly almost all national funding and with interme-
diary bodies and research organizations having a 
very limited role in allocating resources to research 
groups. Funding streams are differentiated by their 
allocation criteria (e.g. between institutional and 
project funding), but not concerning the organiza-
tional setting (e.g. having different agencies in 
charge of project funding). Institutional funding to 
research groups is substantially larger than project 
funding (70% against 30%). 
The Estonian model displays the opposite pattern 
with almost complete delegation of funding to 
(largely uncoordinated) agencies financing all per-
formers (at least in principle), but with a very strong 
concentration at the level of performers, with only 
three large players and one generalist university 
(Tartu) covering most of research areas. The share of 
project funding (78% of public funding) is very high 
in the European context. 
Finally, the Czech Republic shows a fragmented 
structure, with a large and essentially autonomous 
Academy of Sciences sector inherited from the 
Communist regime alongside a large higher educa-
tion sector, subject to a much more competitive allo-
cation of funding (with competitive research plans at 
the level of whole universities). The share of project 
funding is fairly large (48%), but there is strong 
fragmentation in departmental programmes related 
to specific policy areas, rather than delegation to 
specialized agencies. 
In a way, it seems these countries exemplify three 
possible organizational structures of public funding: 
Poland is a good example of the vertically integrated 
system (managed by scientists’ representatives) 
which characterized France in the old centralized 
system based on the CNRS and other large PROs 
(Mustar and Larédo, 2002), while the Estonian sys-
tem resembles closely the US model where research 
funding is based on project funding agencies. Fi-
nally, the Czech system is not too far from the situa-
tion in a number of western European countries such 
as Germany, Spain and Italy, characterized by two 
thirds of general funding, mostly to universities, and 
one third of project funding and the coexistence of 
universities and large PROs competing for projects 
and receiving institutional funding through distinct 
channels (Lepori et al, 2007a). It would take a 
broader comparative analysis to understand if these 
are the only basic organizational forms of public 
funding and to look deeper to national variants (e.g. 
 Project funding 77% 
MER 
Institutional funding Project funding 
ESF Enterprise 
Estonia 
University of Tartu University of 
Tallinn 
Other HE Private 
22% 28% 23% 
11% 5% 18% 2% 
10% 
Public 
institutes 
3% 1% 8% 4% 6% 1% 
EU FP 
16% 
6% 12% 2% 5% 1% 1% 1% 2% 6% 1% 
Figure 8. Estonia: structure of the public funding system, 2005 
Note:  Only the main funding instruments have been considered that in 2005 accounted for 90.2% of the total funding. The numbers 
at beneficiaries need not to add up to 100% because of rounding. For some of the Enterprise Estonia funding (about 2% of  
research funding) the sums were indivisible across beneficiaries 
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in the organization of project funding agencies, as 
shown in the case of western European countries). 
The relevant question is why in the transition 
from a broadly similar Communist system — char-
acterized by strong centralization and the central role 
of the Academy of Science — these countries de-
signed three very different systems, with differences 
which are larger than between continental European 
countries and seem to span the whole range of or-
ganizational forms of public research systems. While 
this would require a deeper historical analysis, the 
case study on Poland provides some suggestions 
(Jabłecka and Lepori, this issue); namely, it shows 
that the breakdown of the Communist regime was so 
rapid and time to design new structures so short that 
strongly contextual factors — such as some experi-
ences with western systems, the personality and in-
dividual beliefs of the involved people and pre-
existing power relations — played a central role in 
shaping the reforms. Under these conditions, one can 
expect that, first, different models and ideas are 
taken in each country and, second, that their transfer 
can lead to very different interpretations given the 
limited information and experience available (as 
demonstrated by the reference to the research coun-
cil model in the Polish case). 
Moreover, exactly because of the short time  
available, structures inherited from the past had a 
lasting effect in shaping the new system, even if the 
official discourse had to represent it as a dramatic 
change. Thus, by and large Poland reproduced at the 
ministerial level the old centralized system of the 
communist Academy of Sciences, while in Estonia 
the need to find an organizational setting for the 
Academy of Sciences institutes — after their separa-
tion from the USSR Academy of Science — and to 
create critical mass in a very small-scale system was 
addressed by merging them into the existing higher 
education institutions, thus leading to the concentra-
tion of performers which is the main structural fea-
ture of today’s system. From an institutional 
perspective, it is not surprising that disruptions of 
organizational fields due to external shocks — such 
as the breakdown of the Communist regimes — led 
to experimentation with different solutions bound to 
contextual factors. 
What is however relevant is the stability of the 
emerging trajectories in the three considered  
countries. Major structural changes took place 
mostly in the 1990s, while in the last decade most 
changes have been evolutionary, such as shifts in the 
relative importance of sectors (Czech Republic) and 
some adaptations in structures and funding instru-
ments (Poland). Of course, learning from other 
countries, imitation and normative pressure, for ex-
ample from the European Commission and the 
OECD, can take place in this phase, but their effects 
seem to be largely incremental and limited by the 
structures already in place. This confirms the wide-
spread belief in theories of institutional change that 
marginal differences in performance between  
(national) systems are not sufficient to trigger large 
structural changes, without external shocks disrupt-
ing the system already in place. 
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Figure 9. Czech Republic: structure of the public funding system, 2005 
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A final remark concerns the impact of these mod-
els on the ability of the state centrally to steer the 
system, on the delegation pattern, as well on the ca-
pacity of promoting diversity and innovation in the 
research system versus the efficiency in the alloca-
tion of resources. Namely, based on the existing lit-
erature, one can argue that well-functioning funding 
systems have to find a balance between largely con-
trasting requirements: first, to allow some steering of 
the research system towards broader policy goals 
versus leaving a sufficient degree of autonomy to 
scientists and research groups (Braun, 2003); sec-
ond, to allocate money to the best performing re-
searchers versus keeping sufficient diversity in the 
research system to let new actors and research ideas 
emerge despite cumulative effects. 
The three considered countries display some po-
tential pitfalls in this respect, as well as the need to 
take into account local conditions in implementing 
funding systems. Thus, the Polish case shows that 
centralization does not necessarily promote steering 
capacity and efficiency, if the required competences 
and information infrastructure is not available. On 
the contrary it led to stability and inertia at least if 
judged at the aggregated level: not only there have 
been rather few changes since 1991, but also the 
Polish system performs rather badly both concerning 
the ability to mobilize resources and the level of 
outputs for academic research. Delegation to funding 
agencies and competition on project funding — 
alongside the very successful US model — would 
seem an attractive solution in this respect. 
However, in the Estonian context the system is so 
small that cumulative effects prevail and a few per-
formers end up dominating the system (Masso and 
Ukrainski, this issue). While this might be very effi-
cient in the short run, one could fear that it might re-
duce innovativeness and responsiveness to new 
needs in the long run. Moreover, one might enquire 
to what extent funding agencies are able to drive the 
development of a research system when for each 
domain there are just a few potential applicants. 
Ironically, a more centralized steering approach 
would seem more adequate in Estonia than in Poland 
given the different size of the system. 
In the Czech case, the concentration of core fund-
ing in the research ministry and the Academy of Sci-
ences creates strong principals for their sector and 
thus allows for more active steering using the re-
search plans instrument. However, sectoral fragmen-
tation in a rather small system entails the risk that 
stable relationships between principals and agents 
largely determine the outcome of the allocation 
process, despite formally competitive criteria, and 
thus reduce competition and efficiency (especially 
for departmental programmes which target very spe-
cific research domains). 
In a nutshell, there is no best organization of  
public funding of research; each model entails its 
own advantages and disadvantages, as well as trade-
offs between different goals (e.g. performance vs. 
innovation); further, the functionality of the different 
models largely depends on their embeddedness in 
specific national contexts and thus what works in 
one country could not perform as well in another 
country. All this opens further interesting avenues 
both for scholarly research and for the development 
of public policies. 
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